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"Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or
Nietzsche and Hermeneutics in
Gadamer, Lyotard, and Vattimo
II

Babette Babich

Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what
the real raw material of your being is, sOlnething quite inedu
cable, yet in any case accessible only with difficulty, bound, para
lyzed: your educators can be only your liberators.
-Friedrich Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator

Nietzsche and Hermeneutics
I aln not about to tell the story of Nietzsche's incorporation, or the resis
tance to the same, into the texts and textures of henneneutic discourse.
Firstly this is because slJch readings have already and in fact been
offered, in various 'ways, by a l1ulnber of authors, and that for a very long
tinle, in articles and even books in English and C;'enllan, in French and
Italian, and so on.l Enacting a banal and utterly unerotic repetition of
S0l11e version of the prinlal scene-the topic of Nietzsche and Zarathus
ira being a particularly "prln1al" exanlplc-it is f~lr froll1 unCOHllnon that
authors declare, again and again (this is vvhat Illakes it a prirnal scene),
that prior to their own uncanny insight, absolutely no one else had ever
'written on (or seen or noticed that) a particular problf~In or other de
served scholarly discussion until they thernsclves tendered their \vords to
a \vaiting world.
So writes the student. This is all so Inuch Anp;/iinl!,'(Tei, as Nietzsche
calls it, alongside NUe Kinderei; good old childishness and "tyroniS111," as
Reg Hollingdale renders the (~ern1an.
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This is also the movie trailer version of philosophy and scholarship
in general, if it is also the breathless legacy of modern science: ne\v, origi
nal, unheard of, cutting-edge, the latest thing. It ought to go without say
ing, but my point is that it does not, that this is a piece of auto-absorbed
nonsense, the kind of nonsense that dependency on the Internet has
only increased.
And this can seem reasonable enough, but it is nonetheless wrong
in the case of Nietzsche and hermeneutics. That is to say: it is inaccurate
with respect to Hans-Georg Gadan1er and it is absurd if we are speaking
of Gianni Vattimo, just because each one writes on Nietzsche, more pat
ently so in Vattilllo's case but not less decidedly so in Gadamer's case.
I am able to say this last on direct evidence because C;adamer was my
teacher. If I have drunk wine with Vattimo (a very Gadamerian and So
cratic and even a very Nietzschean thing to have done), I do not claim
to know him ·well. I do know that Gadamer \vas proud to have been as
sociated with Leipzig because of Nietzsche and proud to have defended
Nietzsche's legacy there, a legacy the Russians at the tilne were eager to
ablate. 3 Thus Gadamer includes in his o\vn ecce homo, his "Selbstdarstel
lung," an explicit reference to Nietzsche. 1
Nietzsche engages the art of interpretation and regards philology
as such an art, and it matters that Gadanlcr himself was a philologist like
Nietzsche. If Gadamer writes lllore about Plato and Aristotle, and indeed
about Kicrkegaard and Hegel, than did Nietzsche, this tells us only that
C;adailler had other tastes than Nietzsche did. Beyond Cadamer we can
find Nietzsche's legacy in othcr herrncneutic voices, voices often named
"postnl0dern" like Vattilllo, but also like Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard and UIll
berto Eco (\vhere it should also be noted that the designation "postmod
ern" often covers incomprehension and is in nearly every case a word for
a failure of reading). And even here wc recall that Nietzsche bears upon
the postmodern not only because there have been book collections dedi
cated to tracing the constellation':) but because he writes against meta
narratives, against the "subject," and above all for the -v"ery nletonyrnically
postlllodern reason that Nietzsche \vould narne a lack of philology 'which
he found to characterize every branch of scholarship, fronl philolof,'Y to
physics. ti
Apart fron1 the problenls of philology and rneta-philology, thc
probleIll with Nictzsche (and no less the problenl \vith Heidegger and
rather less, but still for SOlllC, the problen1 with C~adan1er) is National So
cialislll, thus \ve cite Nietzsche gingerly. Nevertheless, if still internal to
this problelnatic dirncnsion, in a constellation attending to Nietzsche's
stylc,' it is essen tial to begin with fIans-C;eorg Gadarncr's rcruinisccnces
upon the trend-setting illlportance of Nietzsche. in the intellectual life
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of his day, as Gadamer in perfectly apposite and perfectly Heideggerian
terms calls Nietzsche "das Europaische Ereignis."8
It is style for Gadamer, and not only for Derrida, that distinguishes
Nietzsche an10ng other great German authors, including Goethe. For
Gadamer, Nietzsche's style promises the "dissipation of all ponderous
ness" (Fehlens alZer Schwere) , in other words, it promises to abolish, or
to put in abeyance the very difficulty usually associated with Germanic
style. 9 This distinctively uncharacteristic, almost un-German lightness
sets Nietzsche among the greatest stylists of the German language.
For Gadamer, as his self-descriptive, self-accounting tells us, to the
influence of both neo-Kantianism and the pathbreaking impact of Hei
degger's thought, to the influence of Edmund Husserl, must be added
the context of a life- and body-philosophy that ,vas inherently Nietz
schean. It is salutary to recall here that even Henri Bergson's impetus
would be adumbrated in terms of this wave-and as Bergson himself was
disn1issed ahnost ,vithout renlainder for Anglo-Saxon (analytic) philoso
phers via Bertrand Russell's cutting derision (no argument and no refer
ence to biographical "fact" was involved here), so too went Nietzsche.
Mockery to this day rernains the leading analytic t~ope of refusal. 10
Its then-effect was to cut or dismiss Bergson (and Bergson's style) as
,veIl as Nietzsche, and later I-Ieidegger (together vvith their respectively
different styles of expression and thought) from the received curriculum
of professional, and that Ineans analytic, philosophy.ll
By contrast with the fate of Nietzsche within analytic philosophy
(which has in the interim been seeking to absorb or co-opt as much
Nietzsche as it can stand), the C;ennan fate of Nietzsche, like the French
reception of Nietzsche, cannot be explained ,vithout considering other
aspects proper to their own respective world-historical political circum
stances. 12 Hence, at least in C;'ennany, it would not be Heidegger or
Baeurnler and it would not be Jaspers or Lowith as much C;'eorg Lukacs's
interpretation of Nietzsche, specifically of his irrationalisnl (echoed in
part in Lc)with's reading of Nietzsche's nihilisn1), that articulated the
lines of Nietzsche's postwar reception. Indeed: Lukacs's interpretation
influenced I-Iaberrnas in particular (if it managed to spare Adorno and
Horkhein1er) .J3
If such references are essential in the case of the (;'erman and
thence to the French and Anglophone reception of Nietzsche's thought,
citations [ron1 Nietzsche lnay not be the only sign o[ the henneneutic
relevance of Nietzsche's thought for henneneutics. J~Iow then shall we
approach this question?
The hennencutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur tnatches Nietzsche
with the lnasters of the kind of sHspicion, alongside Freud and J\tlarx, rul
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ing our contelTIpOrary scholarly sensibilities. 14 But here and already, the
word »suspicion« ~ term Ricoeur borrows from Nietzsche, turns 'out to be
explicitly didactic, intended to indicate the kind of suspicions that ought
to, if they do not always, frame our thinking. I5 As no one less than Michel
Foucault takes up Ricoeur's signal triumvirate, I have elsewhere argued
that it is essential to Ricoeur's comparison, as it is comparably essential
to reflect with reference to others who similarly invoke Nietzsche, that
Ricoeur is not original. 16 Horrors. So, far from coining an expression by
articulating this wonderfully French ,image of a hermeneutic ofsuspicion, in
fact we find (this is the trajectory of influence, as it is also Gadamer's his
tory of efficacy, or Wirkungsgeschichte), that Ricoeur only translates, and
what a difference the resonance makes, Nietzsche"s own quotation of a
"school of suspicion," which felicitous phrasing is not even original to
Nietzsche hilTIself. Ricoeur quotes Nietzsche, who in turn quotes what is
"said" of his writings. In a late-written preface to one of his most difficult
books (also his largest), Hurnan, All Too lfuman, Nietzsche confesses or
boasts: "Iny wri tings have been called a school of suspicion [eine Schule
des Verdachts] ."17 It should also be noted in passing, and this is the reason
I elTIphasized that this comrnent is a late-written preface, to a previously
published book, evidently referring to a review, that Nietzsche can ap
pear to do little else throughout his life than return to his books, ahnost
like, just like contemporary academic authors (what does this tell us?).
Apart from reading Nietzsche's words on his characterization as
an educator in suspicion \vith some suspicion, what does Nietzsche offer
hermeneutics? What questions, to speak with Heidegger and with Gada
mer and with Nietzsche, ought we to ask?
In what follows I take up this question obliquely because I address it
directly elsewhere, by talking about the politics of interpretation, hernle
neutics, genealot-,ry, by offering yet another requiem for the postmodern,
of the sirnulacrurTI of comnlunication that is the Internet.

Settling Debts: Death and the
Hermeneutics of Genealogy

Drinking the henllock to 'which he would very literally o\ve his death,
Socrates affirnled a debt of a rooster and with his last words, so Plato tells
us, asked his friend Crito to nlake paynlent on his behalf as an offering
to i\sclepius, the folk god of healing.
In Nietzsche's version, Socrates declares: "To live-that Ineans to
be a long tilne sick: lowe a cock to the saviour Asclepills."lR Scholars like
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emphasizing that the paradox of these final words is found in the nature
of Socrates' healing: hemlock as nostrum. For Nietzsche, this Anaximan
drian vision.bf death reflects the rectification of the violation of cosmic
oneness or unity that is the injury wreaked by unique or individual life.
Naming Anaximander the thinker of the "most profound ethical prob
lem," Nietzsche is able to place these words into Anaximander's mouth:
What is your existence worth? And if it is worth nothing why are you
there? By your guilt, I observe, you sojourn in this world. You will have
to expiate it by death. Look how your earth fades; the seas decrease and
dry up, the marine-shell on the mountain shows you how much already
they have dried up; fire destroys your world even now, finally it will end
in smoke and ashes. But again and again such a world of transitoriness
will ever build itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Be
corning? 19

Like Socrates' obligation to Asclepius, I began by noting Gadamer's and
Vattirno's and even Ricoeur's "indebtedness" to Nietzsche. Hence, and
reference to other authors can make this still plainer, the very idea of a
"debt" to Nietzsche affirnls an essential and suspiciously dangerous and
even fatal influence.
By the claims of influence-this is especially characteristic of the
rnodern litigationist and no less proprietary age-one claims priority
and means to insist upon intellectual tribute, a kind of copyright on an
idea or even genius. Hence one is compelled to argue against influence
in order to affirm novelty. Such ascriptions of innovation (or denials of
the sanle) are duly registered to and debited froln a kind of scholarly
patent office. Hence we do better to ask if there was such a debt between
contelnporary representatives of the hermeneutic tradition and Nietz
sche to begin ,tVith.
We could say not, and we ,tVill say this, especially if w'e favor the con
terllporary herrneneutic thinker in question, and if we do not, we lnight
he sinlilarly 1110ved to deny such affinity in the reverse direction, albeit
for correspondingly differen t reasons, if we like Nietzsche. Everyone
roots for the h0111e teanl and every team player resists the imputation of
influence. Every thinker his ovvnJesus.
1laving begun by referring very generally to C;adanler and Ricoeur
and Vattinlo, it rnay be helpful to explore this questioIl l)y invoking a
Illore oblique case in nlore detail, taking up the question of Nietzsche's
influcnce on Lyotard. If Lyotard docs not read his Nictzsche as one reads
Nietzsche arnong Nietzscheans, alluding to or citing certain texts and ex
plaining thell1 to readers vvho have already read (and often cited and

even explained) the same texts, Lyotard. explicitly affirms or acknowl
edges Nietzsche's influence. 2o
So far so good, but is this enough to speak of an intellectual "in
debtedness"?
Perhaps we might have to go further and actually read Lyotard.
If so, we are in trouble if we are Nietzscheans (and even if we are
not), for Nietzsche tells us that reading does not come to us automati
cally: we need first to learn to read, so he tells us, and then we need to
read in fact or actually, something we do only reluctantly and then only
with authors who matter, or where the investment can pay us back (for
the sake of, or as Nietzsche said, in order to write a book or essay of one's
own. But in such cases, so Nietzsche points olit, one is not reading).
The common problem of academic and scholarly diffidence is not
different in the case of influence, for in order to trace influence we need
to read and not merely hunt for names (hardly much of a hunt in any
case, given electronic search engines: we click and we know). Beyond
such reflections on reading, other scholars have asked after the cogency
of speaking of the very presumption of the "French" Nietzsche filtered
by way of Heidegger (more on this below), and Lyotard would fall within
this same category, Heideggerian as he was supposed to have been. The
point is the delimitation of the relevance of Heidegger in this same con
junction, including Jean-Paul Sartre but also Jacques Derrida, and in
evitably Gilles Deleuze, Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowksi, and perhaps
above all, Michel Foucault, and so on. 21
Thus we ask: was Lyotard (or Gadamer or Vattimo or Foucault or
indeed I-Ieidegger) indebted to Nietzsche after all?
Would he have been "indebted" in the way that Bataille may be said
to have been indebted to Kojeve, say?
Here we can recall Richard Beardsvvorth's respectfully dutiful ef
forts to keep Lyotard focused on Nietzsche in his 1994 interview with
hiTn on the subject. Intervie,,,,s are ahvays disappointing, for they prolnise
the chance to read/hear what an author "really" thinks on this or that
and instead, if one is speaking with a thinker ·with his ,,,,its abo~t hilu
(and Lyotard and Heidegger offer fairly good exaluples of this), one
hears only confessional relnarks, such as "Ill)' relations ,vith Nietzsche
have ahvays been a series of beginnings. Of course, I re-appropriate him
massively."22 This very Heideggerian reflection deserves our attention,
and one supposes that Beards·worth rnight have done \vell to have taken
Lyotard at his vvord, for if he had he might have pressed hil11 about such
beginnings', particularly relevant with a thinker such as Nietzsche.
To rephrase the question: is there ever an absence of debt in the
sense of influence? Note well that we arc not speaking in exactly eco
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nomic terms: that is, we are not, indeed, speaking of intellectual capital,
as if an idea were something one could live on. This does not mean, of
course, that intellectual "stars," like Derrida-but also like the late Rich
ard Rorty and the unfailingly thoughtful Alasdair MacIntyre or, popularly
now', Stephen Hawking-have not done very well for themselves. But
beyond the marketplace of saleable ideas and lectureships (that is also
to say, the beginning of nihilism), N~etzsche spoke of living with one's
thoughts as one lives with companions of solid flesh and pulsing blood.
Nietzsche was far more exigent than Pierre Bourdieu, the philosopher
turned sociologist (perhaps by dint of an all-too-academically routine
opportunism, which is again the venal matter of getting a job to begin
with, so that Bourdieu got the chance to become Bourdieu in the first
and last place), because Nietzsche remained classical enough in his sen
sibilities to believe that anyone who seeks to earn a living from his ideas
was not to be distinguished from the slave or anyone else who works in
exchange for lIioney (this ought not to be taken to mean that Nietzsche
did not have his own very ordinary and ordinarily monetary ambitions).
But doing things "for the money" always has an effect on the result.
Are we not in deeper ways rnore' indebted to those we refuse or
ignore? I am speaking of those we fail to cite, fail to read, fail to see.
Or lnaybe the language of debt and the above and inevitably rneto
nymic talk of venality should be limi ted to the matters of eCOn0111y? What
are the obligations in the exchange-world of scholarship? If everyone I
leave out of my reading sphere circumscribes that same sphere, are they
not therefore included by reason of the same specific, that is, exactly
non-arbitrary exclusion (and this will have nothing to do with intention,
for there is an unconscious in the scholarly world as there is in the body
and in the life of the lIlind)? In this sense, do I not also discount every
nanle accoun ted for by frequency of reference-or, and this is the en
gine of the ne\v industry of source scholarship, by 111ention alone? Can I
refer to an anthor if I do not do so by name?
Of Nietzsche, Lyotard says, "of course," in a casual concession: "1
re-appropriate him Inassive'Iy."2:1 Indirect allusion is the purest acaclernic
kind, and this is especially true for the French-as Anglophone students
of Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, even Bourdieu, not to Inention Derrida
or R.icoeur or Baudrillard, have learned (or need still to learn).
To this degree, any effort to lirnn Nietzsche's influence on Lyotard
(or anyone else) \vill have less to do 'with Lyotard's engagenlent \\lith
Nietzsche or the inevitably Hletonyrnic Nietzscheanisrn of French phi
losophy (a Nietzschcanisrn culnli1l3ting, with a Freudian tic troped by
putative denial [that is if one linlits one's reading to the title alone], in
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Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut's collection Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietz
scheens [lVhy We Are Not Nietzscheans]) than -with 'sheerly random detail.24
It is significant that the authors in the utterly Nietzschean,just con
sidering the title alone, lVhy We Are Not Nietzscheans do not so much oppose
Nietzsche as they reflect upon the loss of a certain way of philosophizing
in his name. Thus, as Robert Legros writes: "How could a philosopher
not be Nietzschean, when all of Nietzsche's philosophy sets out to radi
calize the two quests. that are at the very birth of philosophy: to criticize
the obvious tenets that carpet the world and, through creation, to evoke
wonder at the irreducible enigma the world conceals? How,"25 Legros
repeats for emphasis, "to pretend to be a philosopher without feeling
oneself to be Nietzschean?"26 A similar sentiment resounds in Philippe.
Raynaud's insightful reflection on Nietzsche's critical Enlightenment
perspective on the Enlightenment itself, as a post-Kantian prqject that
was begun but ought not end with Nietzsche. 27
I would argue that even less than this reflection was involved in
Frederic Jalneson's invocation of Nietzsche's name as a specifically un
specific, I Inean to say, universal solvent in his preface to the English
translation of Lyotard's Postmodern Condition. 28 Thereby, exactly thereby,
Lyotard's debt to Nietzsche could be consolidated by collective associa
tion, rather than engagement, and whateverJameson meant by invoking
Nietzsche in this context need have little to do with Nietzsche himself.
fIey, a pretext is a pretext.
Nietzsche's name is that of a conventional signifier of the first order,
and to this saIne extent "Nietzsche" is a figment of the Zeitgeist with little
connection to the thinker hiInself, just as Heidegger repeatedly empha
sizes in his Nietzsche lectures-an emphasis lost on Nietzsche scholars
who have gone to Heidegger's Nietzsche looking for yet another explica
tion de texte in Heidegger, but \vho typically stop before finding them
selves knee-deep in far more of the same than they \vould ever have an
ticipated, a point Derrida has al\vays and rightly emphasized.
"Vithout reading too deeply, Lyotard's debt to Nietzsche can be
imagined to be little Inore than another word for wild-Inan-style phi
losophy, the first step in a chai.n of other linkages. Given other pretexts,
Nietzsche can be read and has been read as a better man's Freud or an
all-purpose signifier for the ultimate truth of Nazism. This is what the
late Richard Rorty calls Nietzschean Schadenfreude--that notoriously un
translatable C;ern1an \Nord for a reprehensibly malicious joy or satisfac
tion in the suffering or n1isfortune of others. 29 Or Nietzsche's n~llne can
be invoked in place of Wagner's (be it to celebrate or else to cOnden111
cultural Wagnerisll1s), or else (and again to COll1e back to our theIne)
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as an all-too-brief stop on the one-way track of nihilism that can take
the reader, and Lyotard, all the way back to Heidegger. And there is no
debate concerning Lyotard's debt to Heidegger or indeed-pace Alan
Schrift-the keen relevance of Heidegger's thinking to both twen tieth
century and contemporary French thought. (The influence continues
indeed in Badiou.) Such associations serve no one particularly well-but
if one begins to talk about Nietzsche and Lyotard (or Nietzsche and any
one else) '. be it in the terms of philosophic thinking or in the terms of
political ideology, one can only begin on such a comparative basis, even
if one usually does so in more or less bad faith. 30
FredericJameson identifies Nietzsche's legacy in Lyotard's thought
as the persistent presence of the postmodern as signifier, as the still
enduring condition of oilr tilnes. We have already noted one conse
quence ofJameson's invocation, as it was this that baptized Nietzsche and
so-called Nietzscheans as postmodern, but that would be still another
story of another term of abuse or misuse.~il Indeed, Inuch of Lyotard's
later writing on "the postmodern" as fable, or as an introductory account
of the same, or as told to children, reads as a kind of belnused frustra
tion with a term gone wild-one he did not invent, a term that canni
balized, if it also drove, his academic reputation and literary/aesthetic
fame. Beyond the fashionable decadence of the terIn "posunodern," still
and at times a term of assault (to identifY scholars one does not like),
we are still absorbed by Lyotard's utterly Nietzschean challenge to the
solidity of words and transparency of language as iInmaculate expression
and transmission in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra ("On Irnmaculate
Perception"-but see also his reflections on sensation and conception in
T'he C;ay Science and his later writings) .3~
The saIne all-too-Nietzschean legacy echoes in the subversive cri
tique of Lyotard's jJetit recits: the paradigrnatic postlnodern 1110Ve point
ing to opposition to the lnaster narrative built into the celebrated cultiva
tion of the small facts that are the very stuff of positive science, precisely
where science rernains the l110st 111asterly narrative of all, both in Nietz
sche's day and in our own. This is why the Nietzsche of 'Ille Birth (~r Trag
edy could speak of Togic recoiling upon itself and biting its own tail (and
one should, when one thinks of this, always think of the f~lscination of
self-fellation, as we Inay be sure that Nietzsche did, if only because that is
what the Gern1iUl Ineans). In all respects, the [orn1 of Lyotard's debt to
Nietzsche relnains literally fragnlentary. i\nd it is Lyotard \vho has given
us an account of the historical and all-too-n10dern reasons for this frag
Inenta tion.
In Inodern tenns, and we O\v(' this, so Nietzsche would argue, in
any event to Laurence Sterne's 7hs/unn ShJJ.ndy, which is to say in specitl
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cally biographical terms, the debt to Nietzsche may also be retraced in
Lyotard's ovvn formation as the debt to Bataille, and of course via Ba
taille's teacher Kojeve. (This is easy to say-it is something else again
to imagine that vve thereby know what this particular debt, shared by so
many, might mean,_ For it is effectively the tale of an approach to phi
losophy apart from the old regime, a literal kind of thinking without a
banister, as Hannah Arendt had it.)33

Legitimacy and Narrative Accounting
Infinite misunderstanding.\t\That I love-what Inakes me cry out
like a lark with joy to the sun-this forces me to speak it out in
melancholy words.
-Georges Bataille, On lVietzsche

If we know the postnlodern as much from its accounts in Un1berto Eco
and in Gianni Vattilno, not to lnention the more prosaic architectural
accounts (Jencks and jamesol), etc.), we also know it in alnl0st its every
detail, before and after the letter of Lyotard's report, inaslTIuch as the
point of the account as it is given in Lyotard's The Postrnodern Condition
is to tell us the story we already knO'w. That is to say: narrative kinds
of knowing ground the rightness, the leg,itirnacy of scientific knowing.
Such political cogency constitutes, for example, the difference between
the racial science of the Nazis (distinguishing superior races from infe
rior peoples) and the contenlporary, post-genolTIe enthusiasln not only
for identifying the genetic basis of disease and physical characteristics
(distinguishing inferior vulnerabilities to be permanently, "finally" ex
punged from the hlunan codex [note the association of science 'with
revelation]) but also for the sake of tracking genes f~)r traits to be culti
vated and ilnproved, whereby everyone's child can be, in the future of
genetic Inanipulation, transfornled into a perfect exemplar of the n1as
ter race of technologically perfected hUlnanity. I note that failing that
last proll1ise, insurance cOlupanies wilI benefit in any case vvith stilllnore
ways to deny rnedical coverage in a country like the lJnited States, where
speculating on health and illness is the cornerstone of a thriving indus
try. The political schelne of c0111pulsory or universal health insurance
adds stillinore resources to the advall tage of the SaI11e industry.
This Sa111C' persuasive p()\ver speaks in the theories of Inight that
justifY \'var,~~~t the saine theories that are c\'idcnt in the popular Inedia's
accounts of the "evolutionarily dClennincd, hardvvired [and pcrf()rce
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incorrigible] basis for [or justification of] men's 'philandering' and
women's 'coyness,' [or for] our capacity to detect cheaters, or to favor
our genetic kin, or to be aggressive," to use a description from a recent
collection of essays written on the impotent side of the current narrative
'
law of science. 35
At the postmodern acme of incredulity we nonetheless have "faith"
in the genetic ideal and in our reductive identity in terms of DNA (we
count on the unalloyed successes of genetic engineering as we debate
the question of the reduplication of souls in a human clone or else in
brain uploading as we argue the merits of the same cybernetic project
to use the term Heidegger borrowed from Norbert Wiener's terms-and
we presume the successes of stem-cell research as we consider the ethi
, cal implications or even the identity of a human-animal mosaic). Thus
we also believe in the saIne iconic myth of the Darwin who, like Gali
leo, survives all denlystification as an eternally resilien t hero of "progres
sive" thought-following the model of the good old, or exactly modern
"narrative of emancipation. "36
Thus the difference between Nazi race science and the ideal of
human genetic engineering is not substance (by any means) but exactly
a rnatter of le{l.,ritimacy, in precisely the way Lyotard argues. For Nietzsche,
this is the reflective condition of knowledge, that is, it is the basis of
Nietzsche's critical reflection on the very possibility of knowledge and
truth.~)7 This critical dependency may be equated, for Lyotard, with our
own all-too-curren t rnodernity.
The critically subversive turn countering this dependency forms
the point of departure for Lyotard's discussion of the postmodern con
dition. To distinguish itself froln and against the ancient and lnedieval
scientific resort to Illetaphysics, that is, in order to be modern, science
refuses the rnetaphysical scherne of argument without, however, repudi
ating its righ t to the ancien t ideal of truth that characterized the first lov
ers ofwisdoI11 (truth for its own sake, and, as Nietzsche would ernphasize,
at an.y price). Thus, for Lyotard, science abandons
the rnetaphysi(:a] search for a first proof or transcendental authority as
a response to the question "\1\;110 decides the conditions of truth?" It is
recognized that the ... rules of the game of science are innnanent in
that gaIl1e, that they can only be established \vithin the bonds of a de
bate that is already scientific in nature, and that there is no other proof
that the rules are good than the consensus extended to thenl by the
experts.

This <lrglnnent itself is the n1erely logical lirnit of a closed systern,
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or less sniveling faith in the "really real" of realism-that is, cheap, antic
empIrICIsm.
For Richard Rorty, in a casually articulated counter-word: such
an argument corresponds to Mary Hesse's commonsensical critique of
scientific knowing. At its sophisticated cutting edge-it would not have
been lost on Rorty that the philosophy of science has, other, more du
rable and more powerful edges-Hesse claims that "it has been suffi
ciently demonstrated [by 'what she, perfectly postmodern in the sense
suggested above, calls the "post-empiricist" Anglo-Alnerican philosophy
of science] that the challenge of theoretical science is irreducibly meta
phorical and unformalizable, and that the logic of science is circular
interpretation, re-interpretation, and self-correction of data in terms of
theory, theory in terms of data.":)9 Rorty argues that Lyotard "happily" ap
propriates this "kind of debunking of enlpiricist philosophy of science ...
Ur:tfortunately, he does not think of it as a repudiation of a bad account
of s,cience but as indicating a recent change in the nature of science."4o
Rorty notes that Lyotard overestimates the liberating potential of
science in the wake of the larger project of the philosophy of science
which, while conceding the integrity and viability of such "demonstra
tion" (and its reference to history, culture, or empiricisIn), busily contin
ues, without the need for any such historico-cultural references, churn
ing out formal analyses of theory, structure, syntax, and semantics. 41
For Rorty, Lyotard goes too far both because he lacks the rigor of
analytic restraint and because, and this is understandable enough for a
one-time Marxist, Lyotard iocates the material salvation of history in his
enthusiasn1 for the empo\vering potential of computers. eyber-aesthetic
enthusiasts frOITI Ray Kurzweil to Manuel deLanda, but also Donna Har
away and Don Ihde and indeed ,C;ianni Vatti rn 0 , all, and despite their
nlany differences, could not agree more with Lyotard on this issue, and
only a reactionary acadernic \voltld dare to say otherwise. Thus "techno
bashing" or "anti-science" sentiment is excluded in advance.
Technology liberates, and virtual technology liberates cOll1pletely
freed as one is of the body, in jJotentia, and this is not to be drearned in a
future of robotic alter egos or rnechanical avatars; one has this potential
already realized in the irreality of the Baudrillardian hypcrreal, a life as
it can exactly vicariously be lived here and novv through cell phones, text
messages, tweets, and status posts on Facebook, not to lllention YouTube
and other Internet video sites. Thus Vattirl10 writes in 2005:
I lUll thinking of the "ludic" (playful) llses of SO[l1e very sophisticated
virtual-reality technologv: e.g., the creation of joyful , even erotic, experi
ences, through the sanle means the Inilitary llses to train space pilots.
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"reality" itself, because it makes less and less sense to object that virtual
reality is 'Just" virtual. 42

At the same time, critique itself is transfornled and found to be
nothing other than that very anti-scientific danger now deplored and
declared out of bounds. 43 Thus we have a positive answer in his "Some
thing like: 'Communication ... without Communication,'" where Lyo
tard muses, "We are losing the earth ... , which is to say the here and
now, but are we gaining something and how are we gaining it? Can the
uprooting which is linked to the new technology promise us an emanci
pation?"44 Lyotard's question is prophetic and explicitly so, thus he nei
ther endorses nor does he criticize. It is not clear that Lyotard really
means to affirm this possibility, in a different voice, echoing Montaigne, '
he had already emphasized the complex registers of the mind's depen
dence on the body in his earlier lecture-chapter "Can Thought Go On
Without a Body?" speaking in Nietzsche's voice here, against the phi
losophers (which ones? the ot~ers, of course, not Lyotard himself, and
where does Nietzsche stand, who had for his part offered similar reflec
tions in his Philosophers'Book and The Gay Science, but above all the Nietz
sche of Beyond Good and Evil?): "If this body is not properly functioning,
the ever so complex operations, the meta-regulations to the third or the
fourth power, the controlled deregulation of which you philosophers are
so fond, are impossible."45
The language is as much Nietzsche's as it is Montaigne's (ceteris pari
lnis) , but Lyotard goes on to list the necessary points of contact for a
script for a disembodied mind, very like those interested in designing
Internet games or interactive sketches for online gaIning cOlnnlunities
(the spaces of the virtual or non-real real that is the locus of nihilism so
popular today) .46 All that remains is to take his pointers. Whether Lyo
tard Ineant his comments archly or earnestly is hard to say, given the
text that is all that is left of the lecture. There is more than one way to
hear the conclusion of his preface in praise of the econonlY, in praise
of development, reflecting that the "debt to childhood is one we never
payoff. "17 C;ames are like that.
Like Michel Serres' celebrationist history of science, Lyotard's pro
technology perspective nlay yet prove to be the most successful acadelnic
take on technology, handily so given, as we have just noted, the virtual
social life of today's youth (and SaIne not so youthful), and thus in spite
of Rorty's htctically easy criticisrns. 10 elnphasize the obliq LIe heart of
lIeidegger's identification of technolot,ry as "nothing technological" is
also to reflect on the ,yay that the hlunan itself is nevel', solely on the basis
ofhulnan resources, the SUIn total of all thatnlakes the hlllnan vv'hat it is.
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The excess beyond that summation i~ the destiny of modern technology
as a modality of revealing or aletheic truth. It is for Heidegger the way
Being in the modern era is made manifest (or shows itself).
The postmodern problem, for Lyotard, is that scientific language
games or, better still (to use the Lyotardian convention of the Differend) ,
scientific "phrasing" games are formal, systems, particularly as parsed in
the terms of analytic philosophy of science. And the trouble with formal
systems-a trouble with logically impeccable credentials via mathematics
(Codel) and indeed the philosophy of science (Duhem-Quine )-is that,
as Lyotard emphasizes, the problem of completeness aI-ways remains the
Achilles' heel of such systems, incorrigible, ineliminable. Such systems
are inevitably internally limited, not because the postmodernists say they
are, but because they are axiolnatic systems. And since the rules of the
language/phrasing game of science are not the rules of completeness
(formally impossible in any case), in the late or postnlodern condition of
conternporary knowledge, phrased via technology, the technical lnoves
of science are no longer reviewed \vith reference to the Kantian ideals
of what Lyotard romantically lists as "the true, the just, or the beautiful,
etc., butto efficiency: a technical move is good when it does better and/
or expends less energy than another."48 T'he upshot of this efficient defi
nition ties into the demand for spending and the complete coincidence
to be found between research (and/or) development and management,
as between pure theory and practical application. As we heard Lyotard
express this coincidence, the "games of scientific language become the
games of the rich, in \vhich whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of
being right."49 Ah, of course. And critics fronl the Indian subcontinent
argue this case as well, without needing any references to Lyotard to do
it (though, as with Lyotard himself, Heidegger and Heidegger's critique
of Descartes turn out to be very important) .50 In this last instance, the
privileged accolade of doing "good science," of being shown to be right,
that is, of having access to the legitilnating discourses of "truth," is what
counts as or what ultinlately proves proof. For Lyotard, the circularity evi
dent in this argtllnentation is no accident. It is the very closed circuit of
the circulation of capital. And \ve Alnericlns need no one to tell us that
Illoney is always legitimation.
So far Lyotard's debt (and he has others beyond the critique of
meta-narratives and the fluidity of discursive signifiers, to the reference
to the body and to desire) to Nietzsche (and did I say Hcidcgger?). \Vhere
Lyotard parts company with Nietzsche is the proxilnate place that Lyo
tard turns out to have accurately anticipated rnodern technolof.,>J (and
that advance lllove is the key techno-signifier). For Lyotard, no\<\' aln10st
quaintly, although other contenlporary thinkers will indeed concur, the
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ideal learning community is to be found in cyberspace, needing no Con
nection to history or to the earth, no connection to any particular place.
Above all, such a locus presupposes an end to the charmingly antique
notion (the title, the prestige, but especially the real-life vocation or just
the job) of the university professor.
Instead of free love, instead of free medical care, a living wage, and
so on, the illusory promised land that the (post-Marxist) Lyotard offers
as liberation (your educators, Nietzsche tells us, are always your libera
tors) turns out to be free schooling without access to a school or the de
gree or the.networked old-boy connections of the same, all guided by the
machine, the ultimate phraser that is the browser, the program, or the
game, the vagaries of the Internet-and a Boolean search. All to be guar
anteed by free Web access, very like the kind inherently on order on to
day's Internet, today's browser-cum-search engine, cum-desktop toolbar,
advertising pop-up and so on. This anti-Humboldtian, anti-professorial
ideal of (and for) the university, the proximate future of our educa
tional institutions in a sense Nietzsche never dreamt, is, of course, the
sweetest current administrative hope at every American university. It
is the dream of a university unencurnbered by faculty: pure tuition; in
e-profits, online learning, in the virtual, projectedly illusionary, imagi
nary world that is the interactive cybernetic ideal. Dot-com dreaming
for the post-labor, that is to say the post-productive, economy. And add
the lnelting of the ice caps on the poles to the dream. We Inay yet have
the long-dreamed passage across the poles from one side of the Western
Hemisphere to the East and vice versa, but the poles of north and south,
and this, as an ancient table of opposites once told us, is a Illatter of cold
and warmth. We lose the distinction in our unrelenting destruction of
the environment. We know this, scholars say this, and we (all of us and
not just other peoj)le) do nothing. We change nothing about our lives and
our way of life. Transportation, Inanufacture, deforestation, destruction,
all business as usual, every bit of it continues apace and spreads across
the globe.
No one, certainly not governnlcnt organizations, nor indeed non
governnlental organizations, and certainly not corporate in terests, is
stopping the destruction of forests, the growth of the desert in an utterly
non-Nietzschean sense; the brutal slaughter of anilnals in factory farIlls
accelerates, the elinlination of habitat guarantees the death of \vild ani
Tnals that hunters (for thrill or profit or habit, as we can now llarne tracli
tion) do not exterrninate, shoot, club to death, trap, net, and so on.
We, not just you or I1le, we \vill ]lot stop until we have fished the
oceans elnpty of all fish, all turtles. And speaking of the dolphins and
\vhales that Ollr sonar inexorablv and alrcadv drives to the ec1Q'e of extinc
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tion if ourJapanese and Norwegian and other fishing boats \vere not also
hell-bent on "harvesting" for a market of cans and restaurants used to an
immediate and immense supply, stock on hand, they are also fished to
replenish the dolphins that die in our entertainment shows or in swim
ming with the dolphins programs, and they die at a rate that keeps a mar
ket primed. Swimming \vith us, towing us, letting us touch them, doesn't
just upset and "insult" dolphins, it apparently kills them.
Nor, this seems all too evident, wil~ we stop until we have stripped
the earth and laid waste to the most ordinary of things, land, water, and
air, all for profit, as profit loves a ,var and as our politics runs only in ac
cord with the dream of capital. Until it too runs, as it has been running,
into the ground.

The Tragedy of the Political Commons, the
Real, and Nietzsche
.So we expect love to be a solution for infinite suffering? And
what choice do we have? Within us anguish is infinite, and we
fall in love.
-Georges Bataille, On lVietzsrhe

Beyond tracing the suit of a debt's legitirnate claim, the question of
honor renlains. For its sake, \ve require Nietzsche's imperative review
of science not on the ground, of science and scientific reason but as a
version of art. 'This does notl cannot "reduce" science to art, as Rorty
and Habermas and other post-Lyotardian critics fear, because Nietzsche
never simply seeks to look at science in the light of art, but always also in
the light of the cOlllplex play of art-in-life. And art is, if anything, even
mOTe of a problerl1 for philosophy than science, even in the context of a
postnl0dern report on the state of knowledge in our tinle, which may be
why thinkers 1'ro111 Heideggcr to (~adalner but not less [ronl Adorno and
Baudrillard to LyoLard and \Tattinlo turn to reflect on art.
For i\ietzsche, the practice of lnodern philosophy of science ilni
tates the practice of Illodern science itself (without, for that, being iden
tical vvith science) as \vhat he nalnes the latest (and best or grandest)
fortn of the ascetic ideal. \t\There Nietzsc he proposes to review science
not only OIl the ground of li fc (or pcnver or w'hat increases the saIne, as
S0111e evolutionarily' lnillded Nietzscheans suppose-happily Inistaking
Nietzsche for 110bbcs, via I)an\Tin, Nietzsche's prilne antipode) but also on
the ground of art, the jffoblpm with science is not that it does not serve to
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enhance life (this it surely does, if it does so clumsily and mechanically/
geekily-where today's techno-scientific hero is exactly proud of his ut
ter lack of style), but that it does so without artistic sensibility. Nietzsche
writes that "the truth is ugly," hence, he explains, we "have art, so that we
are not undone by truth."51 The art in question is not art for art's sake or
for its honesty (the truth of art is the avowed truth of untruth), but art as
a celebration of beauty.
Since, asJean Baudrillard has it, the consumer triumph epitomized
by the enduring simulacra of American cold-war advertising ideals and
ideologies, what counts in the place of truth and beauty is the practical
good. What Lyotard nan1es "the spirit of performativity," assuring the
ideal Inatch of means/ end, corresponding to "the best possible input/
output equation," is what can be done. 52 That is, it is not a matter of is
ilnplying ought, or the other way around. What is operative is the simple
impetus of possibility; what can be done is what is done.
The logic of practice, which is the logic of craft or art, which is
technology, rules inthe postmodern condition of exactly scientific knowl
edge. It is not the Platonic-Aristotelian or nletaphysical ideal of truth but
Inerely funding that is at stake. And the practical applications of tech
nol0 61' are as circular as the same narrative self-referentiality. Thus, to
say that "incredulity toward metanarratives"53 characterizes the postmod
ern condition or that "the grand narrative has lost its credibility"54 is to
elnphasize that the point of the story told is irrelevant. Accordingly, "the
blosso111ing of techniques and technologies since the Second World ''''ar,
which has shifted en1phasis from the ends of action to its rneans," betrays
the decline of narrative, and technology is not merely a further con
tribution to the old Enlightenment narrative of liberation. 55 The quote
Lyotard takes from Nietzsche as the explanans for the phenornenon of
"European nihilism"-that favorite signirying term of both French struc
turaliS111 and post-structuralism-resulted from the truth requirelnent
of science being turned upon itself 5G and (as already noted) biting itself
in its O\\1n tail. ~)7
The cool height of Nietzsche's critical pr(~ject-"I airn to regard the
question of the value of kno\vledge like a cold angel who sees through
the 'whole shabby business, not with cruelty but 'without vvannlh"5x-is no
correlate but is antipodal to Bel~jalnin 's theoretically becalnled figure
of history. Nietzsche's cold angel sees through the gray passivity of the
gray scholars who believe in truth. 59 But derying representation, like the
sublirne in Lyotard's later writing, vvhat Nietzsche calls the truth of art is
not a representation of the real. To use an aesthetic exalnple which Lyo
tard specifically traces beyond Nietzsche to Kant's third critique (reduc
ing Nietzsche's perspectivisnl to nihilisHl in the process), the "theule of
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the sublime"50 invokes what Jacques Lacan called the Real, in relation to
Nietzsche's understanding of nature as will to po\ver, the world as chaos
to all eternity.51
Like this chaos, the Real comes to unimaginable, unspeakable pres
ence in the still uncountenanceable events of September II,. It is not that
there are, there were no images of what occurred. T\vo skyscrapers fell
slowly, as if in a perfectly controlled, ordered demolition, one after an
other, in a well-documented, manifold, and constant abundance of im
ages. 52 Nor is there any kind of deficiency (in any sense of the term) to be
found in the analyses of the significance of what happened. But on that
day, as Ne\v Yorkers, as those \vho were proximally closest and (we hardly
need Heidegger to tell us this) ontologically furthest from the event, we
found ourselves brought to, \ve under\vent or suffered-this was not an
experience-a mind-suppressing submersion in the Real.
Lacan tells us that the Real is "what we stumble over-and miss. "63
We need to read this Real not merely i'n the torsions of Lacan's terrninol
ogy but in terrns of Baudri~lard's reality principle, the hyperreal-as-real,
his integral reality.M This is not the contingent brutality of an inelim
inably factive encounter. Instead \ve fail to see the totalizing residue,
ashes 1110re invisible than nonexistent, we deny the dust of two volatilized
skyscrapers-concrete and steel and lTIortal remains-denied, \vaste im
possible to conceive or to imagine. The ~evastation, the annihilation in
question was the work of modernity itself. But Descartes was able to dis
solve not only his body but the whole of the earth and all the heavens
with it, all kneaded into his o\vn imago/ ego, by thinking alone. Today we
project ourselves into glowing screens and locate ourselves and find love
and all kinds of lneaning there.
'This p()\ver to really \vill nothing (the virtual: Baudrillard's hyper
[or a-] reali ty), the uncanny legacy of our consummately intentional
hunlan and (in) hUlnan way of l?eing (expressed in terms of a life with
and arnongMayan pyrarnids, Chinese bones, Greek masks, or for us to
day, our autolnohiles into the fenders of which we project ourselves at
speeds of seven ty 111iles an hour and 111ore , or else and lTIOre lilnitedly,
Inore absorbingly, everybody's favorite Internet, be it average or arcane),
is the secret to the power of modernity, and Nietzsche called it nihilisnl.
Thus he has his Inadnlan in The Gay Science ask: "Ho\v could we drink up
the sea? \I\'ho gave us the sponge to wipe a\vay the entire horizon? What
were we doing when \ve unchained this earth fronl its sun? Whither arc
we Inoving now?"(i:) And in the third section of On the (;enealogy of iV[or
als, where Nietzsche details the fundalnen tal kinship bet\veen science
and religion as instantiations of the saIne ascetic ideal that drives 1110dcr
nity, he ans\vers his own Inadll1an'S ilnpetllous query: "Since Copernicus,
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man seen1s to have got himself on an inclined plane-now ,he is slipping
faster and faster away from the center into-what? Nothingness?"66 The
fact that we ourselves have outlined this trajectory does not change the
register of the Real to one that can be made less insurgent. For that
we will need art, not for art's sake, but for the sake of life.
In Kant's Critique ofJudgment, the unencompassable countenance
of the world in all its excess is the reality of nature beyond representa-'
tion. For Lyotard, the negative theological insight at the heart of the
biblical prohibition of images recalls the analogical recogni tion of the
incommensurability of human knowledge with its sublin1e object, that
is, as Spinoza first articulated this alternative reflex: "Deus sive natura."
Like Nietzsche's consonant dissonance, or joy exactly through and in
suffering,67 modern art as Lyotard describes it "pleases only by causing
pain."68 If, as Lyotard suggests, "the avant gardes in painting ... devote
themselves to making an allusion to the unpresentable by means of vis
ible presentations," presenting "the fact that the unpresentable exists,"69
then, contra Lyotard, we need Illore than a list of the narnes at the cut
ting edges of the art world, ~s~ an ethos that folds itself out of currency.
We need Illore th4n a flight to the cultural privileges of art; more than
a thinking 'that binds itself as closely as Lyotard does to the opposition
between the beautiful and the sublime.
Beyond modern art and more than postmodern efforts, Nietzsche
reminds us that what we need rnost is to learn to see as artists see: this
is, would be, could be an artist's artistry, and only an artist's artistry can
permit us to speak of art in the light of life.
Nietzsche is speaking of a creative aesthetics, an active aesthetics.
As an increasingly endangered capacity in us, as artists who have forgot
ten ourselves, Nietzsche urges us to bring forth a dancing star, to spin
this out of ourselves as the poets we want to be, as Nietzsche writes, of
our lives.
In this sense, Nietzsche rneans the dance literally, and he sees the
dancing in the contelllplation of the dancer, as Alain Baniou has rightly
read hinl in his lnaesthetics. But Nietzsche also 111eans the dance of life,
before the unknown god, before the seducer god, and this is pure llleta
phor. This poet's dance can be the throw of the dice or the Inere 'whirl of
existence at the sn1allest level of the inadvert~nt and the everyday.
Fronl such a perspective, the beauty of art does not take a position
outside or beyond science. Instead it clairns the transfiguring necessity of
art internal to science, of art as identical with science, as both rIeidegger
and Nietzsche insist 011 this identity. Nietzsche began his reflection on
ancient (;reek traubedv ,vith this trag,ie insight 'with which and to which he
ahvavs returned,'!)
~
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Art is possible to the extent that the human being'has made some
thing of herself/himself. In this liberating transformation, Vattimo can
argue that one may ultimately regard asceticism as "a promise of the
future,"71 which he also speaks of as "the ability to live through the expe
rience of the tragic. "72 This transfigured, perdurant sens~e works as what
Nietzsche named his "artist's metaphysics"73 because, as Vattimo, writes,
following Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche, the "Will to Power (i.e.,
'the world') is art ,and nothing but art."74
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